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Abstract 
Why do some artists make worlds while others make 
works? This article considers the renewed attention to 
world-making as a key trope in contemporary artistic 
practice in relation to the world-making tactics of 
science fiction. Nelson Goodman’s 1978 book Ways 
of Worldmaking provides the entry point for this 
enquiry.  
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This paper argues for a link between the 
‘world-making’ enterprises of science 
fiction writing and a renewed attention to 
world-making as a key trope within the 
field of contemporary art [1]. Although 
world-making has long been recognized as 
a major tactic in science fiction writing 
(critics and fans often focus on the texture 
of a world, its unique language, its holistic 
appearance, the extent of the gadgetry or 
societal structures proposed), it also plays 
a significant role in the generation of 
visual and temporal experiences by 
contemporary artists, particularly in works 
of contemporary art that foreground 
immersion within specifically constructed 
spatio-temporal environments. The 
questions I want to ask are: what 
distinguishes works from worlds, and what 
specific criteria might a ‘world-making’ 
enterprise entail?  
This inquiry hinges, in part, on the idea 
of ‘inhabitation’ – the inhabitation or 
immersion in a world versus an encounter 
with a work. Positioning contemporary art 
as a world-making exercise forces us to 
think about the ways in which we are able 
to inhabit works of art, or how works 
become amenable to processes of 
inhabitation. We might argue that part of 
what makes a work of art inhabitable is its 
believability: the manner in which the 
imagined world is able to convince or 
entice a spectator to either dwell within its 
ethos or commit to its conceptual alliances 
(an imperative I will return to later on). If 
this is the case, then considering the 
differences between the making of textual 
worlds and the worlds materialized in 
durational, time-based works of art can 
potentially generate new understandings of 
the role of narrative in representational 
forms.  
The starting point for my thinking 
around this issue is Nelson Goodman’s 
now canonical book Ways of 
Worldmaking, published in the United 
States in 1978. As is well known, Nelson 
Goodman was an American philosopher 
and a major proponent of analytic 
philosophy in the United States. He 
completed his PhD at Harvard in 1941, and 
during his lifetime published numerous 
books that addressed, from a philosophical 
stance, the relationship between perception 
and knowledge, most often with regards to 
linguistics, but also in relation to 
aesthetics. Although Goodman was not an 
art historian and had no academic art 
historical training, he was a serious scholar 
of perception and cognition, a keen 
collector and patron of the arts, and for a 
time he was also the Director of the Dance 
Center at Harvard University in the 1970s 
and 1980s [2].    
Perhaps one of the important elements 
of Goodman’s legacy for the discourse of 
contemporary art is his rephrasing of the 
question ‘what is art’ to ‘when is art’? In 
other words, in the name of what temporal 
conditions are the borders of art 
maintained? When does art appear; how is 
it marked out and distinguished in time? 
These are questions that I find myself 
returning to constantly in my work on 
time-based contemporary projects. These 
are also questions that many contemporary 
artists are now asking themselves, against 
the backdrop of an art world in which 
temporary projects and intermittent 
displays are becoming increasingly 
prevalent, while the timing of a work’s 
exposure (on the market, in an exhibition, 
biennale, art fair, etc.) is fast becoming a 
measurable indicator of its subsequent 
‘success’.  
So, to return to Goodman: right at the 
start of his book Ways of Worldmaking, 
Goodman argues that all worlds, no matter 
where and how they are made or the form 
they might take, are made from the stuff of 
other worlds. The creation of a world 
relies, in other words, on processes of 
recycling. He writes:  
 
The Many stuffs – matter, energy, 
waves, phenomena – that worlds are 
made of are made along with the worlds. 
But made from what? Not from nothing, 
after all, but from other worlds. 
Worldmaking as we know it always 
starts from worlds already on hand; the 
making is a remaking [3].  
 
For Goodman, this idea of ‘making as 
‘remaking’ enables the construction of 
numerous, contradictory worlds. It is 
important that his thesis is called ‘ways of 
world-making’, as it is in part an attempt 
to reconcile how two or more 
contradictory states can share a claim to 
reality.   
Although Goodman outlines several 
tactics or approaches to world-making in 
light of this goal, what is most interesting 
to me about his argument is not so much 
his identification of world-making 
processes, but his attempt to evaluate the 
criteria for success in making a world [4]. 
In other words, how do you make a good 
one? Or, as Philip K. Dick asked, ‘how do 
you build a universe that doesn’t fall apart 
two days later?’[5]  
Is ‘truth’, for example, an essential 
component in creating a world and 
maintaining its stability? Does a world 
need to have a quantifiable truth-value in 
order to be properly inhabitable? 
According to Goodman, the answer is no, 
and I agree with this. ‘In a scientific 
treatise’, he explains, ‘literal truth counts 
most; but in a poem or novel, metaphorical 
or allegorical truth may matter more and 
… For non-verbal versions, truth is 
irrelevant’ [6]. With respect to art, truth is 
not a satisfactory benchmark for 
evaluating the success of a world-making 
enterprise, for artists make worlds 
metaphorically as well as literally, and 
their construction is often contingent upon 
factors that elude mimetic or cognitive 
categorization. ‘We risk confusion’, 
Goodman writes, ‘when we speak of 
pictures or predicates as ‘true of’ what 
they depict … they have no truth value and 
may represent or denote some things and 
not others’ [7]. 
Instead of ‘truth’, then, Goodman 
introduces the idea of ‘rightness’ as a 
determining factor. He further suggests 
that this ‘rightness’ is discernible and 
measurable in terms of four qualities: 
coherence, cogency, compactness, and 
comprehensiveness. Together, these make 
up what he calls ‘the ‘informativeness and 
organizing power of the whole system’ [8].  
When I first read this description I was 
immediately struck by its similarity to 
Nicolas Bourriaud’s insistence on what he 
called the ‘pressing need’ for 
contemporary art not simply to offer a 
reflection of the world in which we live, 
but to actively shape the way in which we 
inhabit it. As Bourriaud wrote:  
 
The role of artworks is no longer to 
form imaginary and utopian realities, 
but to actually be ways of living and 
models of action within the existing real, 
whatever the scale chosen by the artist 
[9].  
 
What Bourriaud concludes from this shift 
is that artists are now directly involved in a 
process of ‘learning to inhabit the world in 
a better way instead of trying to construct 
it based on a pre-conceived notion of 
historical evolution’ [10]. What is directly 
apparent about this argument (and also 
Goodman’s) is that it is staked out across 
the territory of ethics. Striving for a ‘better 
way’ of inhabiting the world implies a 
value judgment that some worlds are better 
than others, and further implies that there 
are criteria for ‘success’ that can be 
attached to world-making processes. 
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The second conclusion we can reach 
from Bourriaud’s statement is that 
contemporary art works can offer possible 
models of inhabitation which, importantly,  
can be carried across from the immediate 
environment of the art work and 
subsequently applied to the real business 
of being and living in the world. This is 
what Bourriaud means when he uses the 
word ‘models’, or ‘models of 
inhabitation’; a model being like a smaller 
version or a metonym for a future 
endeavor. A model is a both a proposal for 
and an abstraction of the world. It is a 
translation or remaking – in precisely the 
same way that Goodman implied when he 
argued that all world-making involves a 
kind of remaking (‘worlds are made … 
from other worlds’) [11]. The art-work-as-
model is then a carrier for a broader 
scenario: it is a seed for a potential future.     
Martin Heidegger famously described 
our individual perspectives as ‘world 
pictures’: ‘each world picture, potentially 
irreconcilable with others’, was understood 
as a ‘form of creative projection that lays 
out a world’ in front of the subject [12]. 
World-making as a literary tactic can also 
be characterized as a process of aesthetic 
and political projection, albeit one with a 
narrative impetus. In science fiction 
novels, for example, the creation of the 
fictional world is most often designed as a 
platform to support the plot of the story. 
This is one reason why science fiction 
writers are so often critiqued when the 
‘worlds’ they create appear to have been 
given more care and attention than the 
characters that inhabit them. An author can 
spend much time inventing alien languages 
or providing detailed blueprints for the 
organization of inter-galactic government 
structures, but even the most die-hard SF 
fans still tend to want to get something out 
of the characters and the plot of the story. 
It is not, then, simply through the 
application of ‘texture’ that a world is 
rendered inhabitable.   
Some examples of renowned ‘world-
makers’ in the literary realm include 
George R.R. Martin (Game of Thrones); 
J.R.R. Tolkien (who mapped out in great 
detail the worlds of his novels well before 
he sat down to write them up); J.G. Ballard 
(a significant reference point for 
contemporary artists working in the mode 
of the ‘science fictional’) and the 
American writer H.P. Lovecraft. One of 
the reasons why Lovecraft was so 
successful at making worlds is because, 
firstly, the mythology he invented to 
support his narratives (a whole history and 
cosmos of mythics beings; ‘the old ones’; 
alien gods and alternate histories) was so 
detailed and comprehensive that it became 
a major attraction for his readers in its own 
right, over and above the plots of his 
individual stories. And secondly, Lovecraft 
deployed his mythology in a serial 
fashion. What I mean by this is that 
Lovecraft’s mythology was used by 
readers to interpret his texts in relation to 
each other, as a series that was extended to 
include all of his work, even those texts 
that did not refer explicitly to what has 
since become known as ‘The Cthulhu 
Mythos’.  
A series is a linking principle; it is a 
sequence made out of a constellation of 
fragments, with each fragment projecting 
the totality of a whole. The serial 
deployment of a world across disparate 
formats and contexts makes it amenable to 
inhabitation because it leaves something 
open for readers or participants to hook 
onto and adapt. In order to remain durable, 
a world needs to be shared, and it needs to 
be built upon. It needs, in other words, to 
be paradoxically complete but 
fragmentary. It needs to have a modular 
frame.   
What happens when we shift this world-
making discourse across to the field of 
contemporary art? James DiGiovanna, in 
his 2007 article ‘Worldmaking as an Art 
Form’, proposes four criteria for 
determining whether or not world-making 
is a goal of a particular art work or series 
of works: 
 
1) In the ideal case, there will be a 
series of works that use the same 
world 
2) That world should differ 
noticeably from ‘our’ world 
3) That world should have a 
geography and history of its own 
4) That world can be enhanced in its 
difference by having physical 
laws different from our own [13]. 
 
This last reference to ‘physical laws’ ties 
in with Goodman’s categorization of 
‘rightness’, and it leads DiGiovanna to his 
most significant observation: that 
‘worldmaking is more concerned with 
creating the truth conditions for fictional 
texts than the creation of the texts’ 
themselves [14].  
I see so much of contemporary art 
reflected in this claim, particularly as 
contemporary art continues to grapple with 
the changing status of the object and the 
image as viable carriers of meaning. It is 
not hard to see that most artists working 
today are involved in much more than the 
generation of discreet objects or singular 
texts. They are also heavily invested in 
interrogating and indeed shaping the 
conditions by which one text can come 
into visibility at a certain time, while 
another simply cannot: a governing 
process that Jacques Rancière calls the 
‘politics of visibility’, another way of 
pointing to the ‘truth conditions’ of an art 
work. Philip K. Dick knew this, writing in 
his journal in 1978 that ‘We live in a 
condition, not a world’, and admitting that 
what he liked to do most was to demolish 
the conditioning principles of ‘reality’ 
[15]. 
This is not, simply, then, a question of 
style. It is not a question of how artists 
handle their materials or choose their 
subjects or arrange their concepts in space 
and time. Inhabiting a work of art instead 
relies on an engagement with the ‘truth 
conditions’ that enable the work to come 
into existence in the first place – an 
engagement with the conceptual platform 
or the sensible structures that permit its 
exposure. This is perhaps why Bourriaud 
continues to insist that, ‘What really good 
artists do is to create a model for a possible 
world, and possible bits of worlds’ [16].  
If Bourriaud is right, and I believe he is, 
then the key question to ask of 
contemporary art is now: could I live in the 
world that this work creates? What kind of 
world is it a model for? There is however 
one problem with this line of questioning. 
Although the world proposed by the art 
work does need to be sufficiently different 
from that of the viewer’s to ‘be’ another 
world, the world is in itself so 
heterogeneous that the ‘difference’ posited 
in DiGiovanna’s schema may be 
impossible to chart. How then, do we 
distinguish worlds from works?  
Although DiGiovanna does provide 
some examples of art works to illustrate 
his claims, these are primarily role-playing 
collaborative fantasy worlds or online 
shared gaming spaces: forms with a 
limited application to my argument. I 
suggest that world-making is easiest to see 
in the works of artists that are 
‘comprehensive’ and ‘consistent’ and 
‘cogent’ (following Goodman’s use of the 
term) – by which I mean works that are 
governed by a set of rules. These rules 
might be procedural, aesthetic, political (or 
all three), and their affects will be evident 
even if their existence remains completely 
unknown or opaque to the viewer.  
There are numerous works that could 
serve as examples here (I think of works 
by Mike Nelson, Robert Smithson, David 
Lynch, Gordon Matta-Clark, or James 
Turrell), but I want to single out 
contemporary German artist Thomas 
Demand for particular mention. As is well 
known, Demand’s process predominantly 
involves remaking found photographic 
images into life-sized three dimensional 
paper and cardboard models, which are 
then re-photographed and exhibited to 
scale as large glossy prints. This is a world 
produced entirely out of cardboard and 
paper, a world that resembles our own but 
is, to use DiGiovanna’s words, 
‘sufficiently different’ so as to constitute 
its own reality. Demand’s world is serial; it 
has a history of its own, and its difference 
is ‘enhanced’ by the consistent application 
of alternate physical (and conceptual) 
laws.  
A contrasting example might be found 
in Pierre Huyghe’s Untilled (2012), 
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installed at Documenta 13. Built on a 
compost site as a weird counter-park in a 
park, Untilled generated a strangely 
addictive immersive environment in which 
natural and human-made elements were 
charged equally with an intense and un-
locatable sense of intentionality. A dog 
and a human inhabited the grounds; 
psychotropic plants were hidden amongst 
the undergrowth and pollinated by a hive 
of bees living on a sculpture of a reclining 
nude. In constructing this other-worldly 
landscape, Huyghe located turtles and 
trees, imported ants and tadpoles, found 
concrete slabs and blocks, filled containers 
with water, and shaped earth and rocks. 
More important than these individual 
formal elements, however, was the work’s 
creation of an atmosphere: an atmosphere 
so distinct, so clearly a fragment of an 
alternate reality, that entry into the grounds 
was like opening a portal to another 
dimension. This was clearly a world in and 
of itself, with its own gravitational pull, 
and its own laws of engagement. As 
Huyghe has admitted: ‘As I start a project, 
I always need to create a world. Then I 
want to enter this world and my walk 
through this world is the work. What takes 
me a long time is to create the world’ [17]. 
The rest is simply detail.   
But perhaps the most urgent question 
that remains to ask of art as a world-
making exercise is: why? Why is it 
important, right now, to distinguish worlds 
from works, and why are artists adopting 
the principles of world-making in their 
praxes? One possible factor might be that 
the world, as a singular entity or a 
representable form, no longer exists. This 
is certainly the answer that Jean-Luc 
Nancy would give – as he wrote in the 
beginning of his book La Création du 
Monde ou la mondialisation (2002), 
globalization has pluralized world vision 
to the point that the world has destroyed 
itself. For Nancy, the term ‘the world’ no 
longer has any sense application [18]. It 
has instead become an homogenizing 
fiction that disguises plurality and masks 
dissensus – the same dissensus marked out 
by Nelson Goodman’s multiple worlds.  
A second possible factor, closely related 
to the first, brings us closer to the 
intersection of art and science fiction. 
Science fiction is, at its core, both a 
conduit for world-making and a mode of 
thought. It is motivated by an ongoing 
acknowledgment that the sensible world – 
the world in which one lives and breathes 
– is mutable, and as such can be changed. 
This is the realm that artist Martha Rosler 
calls ‘the what if’: the world as a 
speculative proposition, a realm purpose-
built for extrapolation.     
For numerous contemporary artists, 
confronting the ‘what if’ or the 
‘mutability’ of worlds often begins not 
with a question of delineation but of 
navigation: how to work with rather than 
work out the powerful tension between a 
limitless fantastical wilderness and the real 
business of being-in-the-world. The drive 
to generate and create science-fictional 
encounters, sensations and experiences, 
rather than simply illustrate science fiction 
narratives, has pulled science fiction off 
the page or the screen and into the here 
and now. In contemporary art, ‘science 
fictionality’ is often articulated in real 
space, in real time [19]. It unfolds amongst 
durations and spaces as a principle of 
engagement and of affect that questions 
the very platforms that permit its 
existence. Working through overlaps 
between fiction and non-fiction, the real 
and the imagined, science fiction is here 
valued for its capacity to construct 
alternate realities and affects out of the 
very stuff from which the present is made.   
That art disorients in productive ways is 
critical, and speaks also to one of the 
founding definitions of science fiction by 
Darko Suvin: the theory of cognitive 
estrangement. In the early 1970s, Suvin 
suggested that one of the most 
revolutionary elements of SF is its ability 
to render thought itself strange, revealing 
the fragility of perception in the making of 
meaning [20]. Although this idea would no 
doubt have appealed to Goodman, it is 
clear that this kind of aesthetic and 
cognitive dissonance is not always a 
rigorously intellectual or even theoretical 
process. It is more often recognizable as a 
sensation, a kind of sensual, vertiginous 
pleasure invoked by the opening of chaos 
or the creation of a hole through which 
another reality might emerge. The new 
worlds of art, then, can they be accessed 
through the delirium of estrangement, 
through the vortices of science fiction, in 
‘no-knowledge zones’? [21] 
Dealing with things not yet to come, 
with images charged with a state of future 
potential or spaces infused with a radical 
temporality, puts us in touch with the 
ability to imagine, and with the 
imaginary’s capacity to build new worlds. 
This is an explicitly political process. As 
Australian contemporary artist Tom 
Nicholson has noted, world-making is 
‘something that is not only really 
important to art, but also to our behaviour 
politically. We need not accept the world 
as it is because we can imagine it – and 
reshape it – otherwise’ [23].  
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